Martin v. ECMC: Iowa bankruptcy judge discharges unemployed lawyer's student loans

In Martin v. Educational Credit Management Corporation (ECMC), decided last February, Janeese Martin obtained a bankruptcy discharge of her student-loan debt totally $230,000. Judge Thad Collin’s decision in the case is probably most significant for the rationale he articulated when he rejected ECMC’s argument that Martin should be placed in a 20- or 25-year, income-based repayment plan (IBRP) rather than given a discharge.

Citing previous decisions, Judge Collins said an IBRP is inappropriate for a 50-year-old debtor who would be 70 or 75 years old when her IBRP would come to an end. An IBRP would injure Martin’s credit rating and cause her mental and emotional hardship, the judge wrote. In addition, an IBRP could lead to a massive tax bill when Martin's plan terminated in 20 or 25 years, when she would be "in the midst" of retirement.


Janeese Martin, a 1991 law-school graduate, is unable to find a good law job

Janeese Martin graduated from University of South Dakota School of Law in 1991 and passed the South Dakota bar exam the following year. In spite of the fact that she held a law degree and a master's degree in public administration, Martin never found a good job in the field of law.

Martin financed her undergraduate studies and two advanced degrees with student loans totally $48,817. In 1993, she consolidated her loans at an interest rate of 9 percent; and she made regular payments on those loans from 1994-1996.

Over the years, there were times when Martin could make no payments on her student loans, but she obtained various kinds of deferments that allowed her to skip monthly payments while interest accrued on her loan balance. By 2016, when Martin and her husband filed for bankruptcy, her student-loan debt had grown to $230,000--more than four times what she borrowed.

As Judge Collins noted in his 2018 opinion, Janeese Martin was 50 years old and unemployed. Her husband Stephen was 66 years old and employed as a maintenance man and dishwasher at a local cafe. The couple supported two adult children who were studying at the University of South Dakota and had student loans of their own. The family's annual income for 2016 was $39,243, which came from three sources: Stephen's cafe job, his pension and his Social Security income.

Judge Collins reviewed Janeese's petition to discharge her student loans under the "totality of circumstances" test, which is the standard used by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for determining when student loans constitute an "undue hardship" and can be discharged through bankruptcy.

Martin's Past, Present, and Reasonably Reliable Future Financial Resources

Judge Collins surveyed Martin's employment history since she completed law school. In addition to three years working for a legal aid clinic, Martin had worked eight years with the Taxpayer's Research Council, a nonprofit agency located in Iowa. Her maximum salary in that job had paid only $31,000, and Martin was forced to give up her job in 2008 when her family moved to South Dakota.

ECMC, which intervened in Martin's suit as a creditor, argued that Martin had only made "half-hearted" efforts to find employment, but Judge Collins disagreed. Martin "testified very credibly that she wants to work and has applied for hundreds of jobs," Judge Collins wrote. Nevertheless, in the nine years since her last job, Martin had only received a few interviews and no job offers.

Judge Collins acknowledged that Martin had two advanced degrees, but neither had been acquired recently. In spite of her diligent efforts to find employment, the judge wrote, she was unlikely to find a job in the legal field that would give her sufficient income to make significant payments on her student loan.

Martin's Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses

Judge Collins itemized the Martin family's monthly expenses, which totaled about $3,500 a month. These expenses were reasonable, the judge concluded, and slightly exceeded the family's monthly income. Virtually all expenses "go toward food, shelter, clothing, medical treatment, and other expenses reasonably necessary to maintain a minimal standard of living," Judge Collins ruled, and "weigh in favor of discharge" (p. 893).

Other Relevant Facts and Circumstances

ECMC argued, as it nearly always does in student-loan bankruptcy cases, that Martin should be placed in a 20- or 25-year income-based repayment plan rather than given a bankruptcy discharge. The Martin family's income was so low, ECMC pointed out, that Martin's monthly payments would be zero.

Judge Collins' rejected ECMC's arguments, citing two recent federal court opinions: the 2015 Abney decision, and Judge Collins' own 2016 decision in Fern v. FedLoan Servicing. “When considering income-based repayment plans under § 523(a)(8),” Judge Collins wrote, “the Court must be mindful of both the likelihood of a debtor making significant payment under the income-based repayment plan, and also of the additional hardships which may be imposed by these programs” (p. 894, internal punctuation omitted).

These hardships, Judge Collins noted, include the effect on the debtor’s ability to obtain credit in the future, the mental and emotional impact of allowing the size of the debt to grow under an IBRP, and “the likely tax consequences to the debtor when the debt is ultimately canceled” (p. 894, internal citation and punctuation omitted).

In Judge Collins’ view, an IBRP was simply inappropriate for Janeese Martin, who was 50 years old:

If she were to sign up for an IBRP, she would be 70 or 75 when her debt was ultimately canceled. The tax liability could wipe out all of [Martin’s] assets not as she is approaching retirement, but as she is in the midst of it. If [Martin] enters an IBRP, not only would she have the stress of her debt continuing to grow, but she would have to live with the knowledge that any assets she manages to save could very well be wiped out when she is in her 70s. (p. 894)Conclusion

Martin v. ECMC is at least the fourth federal court opinion which has considered the emotional and mental stress that IBRPs inflict on student-loan debtors who are forced into long-term repayment plans that cause their total indebtedness to grow. Together, Judge Collins' Martin decision, Abney v. U.S. Department of Education, Fern v. FedLoan Servicing, and Halverson v. U.S. Department of Education irrefutably argue that the harm IBRPs inflict on distressed student debtors outweighs any benefit the federal government might receive by forcing Americans to pay on student loans for 20 or even 25 years--loans that almost certainly will never be paid off.

References

Abney v. U.S. Department of Education, 540 B.R. 681 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2015).

Fern v. FedLoan Servicing, 553 B.R. 362 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2016), aff'd, 563 B.R. 1 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2017).

Fern v. FedLoan Servicing, 563 B.R. 1 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2017).

Halverson v. U.S. Department of Education, 401 B.R. 378 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009).

Martin v. Great Lakes Higher Education Group and Educational Credit Management Corporation (In re Martin), 584 B.R. 886 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2018).

Rowe v. ECMC : ECMC couldn't prove Mr. Rowe owed on his daughter's student loan

Educational Credit Management Corporation [ECMC] is the Department of Education's premier student-loan debt collector.

ECMC has appeared in literally hundreds of student-loan bankruptcy cases, and it knows all the legal tricks for defeating a student-loan borrower's efforts to discharge student loans in bankruptcy. And most of the time ECMC wins its cases.

But not always.

Last June, Judge Catherine Furay, a Wisconsin bankruptcy judge, ruled in favor of Thomas Rowe, who sought to discharge a student loan he said he didn't owe. ECMC claimed Rowe signed a student loan on behalf of his daughter. Rowe said he didn't sign the loan and that any signature appearing on the loan document must be a forgery.

Rowe declared bankruptcy and filed an adversary proceeding to discharge the student loan ECMC claimed he owed. A trial date was set, but neither Rowe nor ECMC filed the disputed loan document with the court.

Judge Furay ordered the parties to file briefs on the burden of proof and concluded the burden was on ECMC to prove Rowe owed on the student loan. Since ECMC did not produce the loan document, Judge Furay discharged the debt.

What the hell happened?

How could ECMC,, the most sophisticated student-loan debt collector in the entire United States, not produce the primary document showing Rowe had taken out a student loan?

I can think of only two plausible explanations. First, ECMC may have had the loan document in its possession but didn't produce it because the document would show Rowe was right-- he hadn't signed the loan agreement.

Second, the loan document may have gotten lost as ownership of the underlying debt passed from one financial agency to another.

Here is the lesson I take away from the Rowe case. If you are a student-loan debtor being pursued by the U.S. Department of Education or one of DOE's debt collectors, demand to see the documents showing you owe on the student loan.

Most times, the creditor will have the loan document, but not always. And, as Judge Furay ruled, the burden is on the creditor to show a loan is owed.

And so I extend my hearty congratulations to Thomas Rowe, who defeated ECMC, the most ruthless student-loan debt collector in the business. Thanks to Judge Furay's decision, Mr. Rowe can tell ECMC to go suck an egg.

References

Rowe v. Educational Credit Management Corporation, No. 17-0033-cf ( Bankr. W.D. Wis. June 28, 2018) (unpublished).

Sue Reagan v. Educational Credit Management Corporation: "A camel whose back is already broken"

 Sue Reagan is 60-years old and lives in a mobile home on rented land. She has a part-time job but lives near or below the poverty line. She took out student loans to obtain a bachelor's degree in administration of justice and a master's degree in criminology, but that was long ago.

Unable to pay back her student loans under a standard ten-year repayment plan, Reagan signed up for an income-based repayment plan (IBRP). Her income is so low, however--$1,286 a month--that her monthly payments are zero dollars.

Reagan filed for bankruptcy and brought an adversary action to discharge her student loans. She argued that her student loans constituted an undue hardship and that she could not maintain a minimal standard of living and pay back those loans.

Educational Credit Management Corporation, her creditor, filed a motion for summary judgment and asked the bankruptcy court to dismiss Reagan's case without a trial.  ECMC argued that since Reagan's monthly payments were zero dollars, she could not reasonably argue that her student loans constituted an undue hardship or that her loans forced her below a minimal standard of living.

But Bankruptcy Judge Gregory Taddonio disagreed with ECMC and refused to dismiss Reagan's case. In Judge Taddonio's view, it did not matter which debt drove Reagan to the edge of poverty. "If she finds herself financially underwater, the question of which obligation pushed her below the surface matters little. To a camel whose back is already broken, any straw in his pack is unwelcome."

Judge Taddonio looked at Reagan's financial information and noted that her expenses were $119 more than her income, which was less than $1,300 a month. Moreover, her expenses were reasonable--mostly going for basic necessities. Judge Taddonio said he could not identify any expenses that could be trimmed.

So Judge Taddonio allowed Sue Reagan's adversary proceeding to go forward. Will she ultimately prevail?

Who knows? ECMC's motion to dismiss was merely the first of many arguments ECMC will make to defeat Reagan's attempt to shed her student loans. And ECMC has unlimited resources. It can hound Reagan for years right up to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

But Reagan's initial victory is heartening, a sign perhaps that the federal bankruptcy judges have begun to acknowledge that the federal student loan program has destroyed the lives of millions of people, most of whom deserve bankruptcy relief.

Augustin v. U.S. Department of Education: Adventures in Fantasy Land (originally posted 10.26.2018)

 In  April 2016, Pierre Augustin filed an adversary complaint in a Maryland bankruptcy court, seeking to discharge $210,000 in student loan debt. He told the court he had been burdened by this debt for 24 years, and that his financial circumstances did not permit him to pay it back. Augustin's wife also had student-loan debt: $120,000. Together the couple had accumulated a third of a million dollars in student debt.

Augustin had three postsecondary degrees: a bachelor's degree in political science from Salem State University in Massachusetts, a master's degree in public administration from Suffolk University in Boston, and an MBA from University of Massachusetts Lowell. Seventeen years after receiving his MBA degree, he was working  as a security guard.

Augustin claimed he was unable to find a job in the field of his degrees, but together he and his wife earned a net income of more than $6,000 a month. The Department of Education (DOE) offered Augustin a 25-year income-based repayment plan that would allow him to pay $331 a month toward his student loans or a 15-year plan with payments of $1,138 a month.

Augustin did not accept DOE's offers. Under the 25-year plan, he argued, he would face a lifetime of indebtedness. Moreover, when the payment term ended, he would face massive tax liability for the amount of forgiven debt. The 15-year plan was also unacceptable, he maintained, because it would not allow him to save money for his retirement.

Bankruptcy Judge Thomas Catliota was not sympathetic. The judge applied the three-pronged Brunner test to determine whether Augustin's student debt constituted an undue hardship.  Under Judge Catliota's analysis, Augustin failed all three prongs.

First, Judge Catliota noted, Augustin could make monthly loan payments of $331 under the 25-year repayment plan while maintaining a minimal standard of living. Second, Augustin could not show additional circumstances that would make it impossible to make monthly payments in that amount.

Finally, Judge Catliota ruled, Augustin had not demonstrated good faith. Augustin had not made a single payment on his student loans for more than a quarter of a century. "By his own  admission,"the judge pointed out, "Mr. Agustin deferred his loans for approximately 26 years."

Moreover, Mr. Augustin was not willing to accept DOE's offer of a  manageable repayment plan. In Judge Catliota's view, "This shows lack of good faith on [Augustin's] part."

Not surprisingly then, Judge Catliota refused to discharge Mr. Augustin's student debt. Applying the three-part Brunner test, Augustine was not entitled to relief.

Perhaps Judge Catliota reached a just outcome in the Augustin case. But let's look at the case in a larger context. Why does the Department of Education loan people money for multiple college degrees and then permit borrowers to make no payments on those loans for 25 years?

Why does the government push people into 25-year repayment plans that allow debtors to make monthly payments so low that they don't cover accruing interest? Even if Mr. Augustin agrees to make income-based payments of $331 a month for 25 years, he will never pay back the $210,000 he owes.

Finally, why apply the Brunner test to people like Mr. Augustin? Why not simply ask whether Mr. Augustin and his wife will ever pay back $330,000 in student-loan debt? The answer is clearly no.

In short, Augustin v. Department of Education is another adventure in Fantasy Land, which is what the federal student-loan program has become. Our government has rigged an insane student-loan program that is trapping millions of people to a lifetime of indebtedness from which there is no relief.

References

Augustin v. U.S. Department of Education, 588 B.R. 141 (Bankr. D. Md. 2018).

Hopson v. Illinois Student Assistance Commission: A clueless bankruptcy judge sentences a 63-year-old student-loan borrower to a lifetime of indebtedness

 Janice Faye Hopson, 63 years old, went to trial in an Illinois bankruptcy court last spring, hoping to discharge more than $100,000 in student loans. The Illinois Student Assistance Commission and the U.S. Department of Education opposed her plea for relief; and Judge Jacqueline Cox, the bankruptcy judge who heard Hopson's case, ruled against her.

At the time of Judge Cox's ruling, Hopson was in a 25-year income-based repayment plan (IBRP) that required her to make monthly payments of zero due to her low income. Indeed, Judge Cox ruled that Hopson could maintain "a substantial standard of living" while making student-loan payments of zero dollars a month (588 B.R. 518).

Hopson argued that she would never pay back $100,000 in student loans under a 25-year IBRP and that the principal on the loan will continue to grow in the coming years due to accruing interest. When the 25-year plan ends, Hopson will likely be in her 80s. Moreover, although DOE will write off the amount of her unpaid debt when the 25-year repayment plan is completed, that amount will be taxable to her as income.

Judge Cox was unsympathetic. If Hopson is insolvent when her 25-year plan ends, Judge Cox pointed out, she can file for bankruptcy a third time and discharge her tax bill on the grounds that she is broke (588 B.R. at 515).

Will Ms. Hopson be insolvent when her IBRP ends two decades from now? Of course she will. At age 63, she has virtually no retirement savings (as Judge Cox acknowledged). Twenty years from now, she undoubtedly will be living entirely off her Social Security checks, estimated to be only $1430 a month.

Although Judge Cox probably did not realize it, she essentially ruled that no student debtor who is eligible for a long-term income-based repayment plan is entitled to bankruptcy relief. Of course it is true in one sense that a person allowed to make student-loan payments of zero dollars a month cannot claim her student loans constitute an "undue hardship" in the present moment. But people making token monthly payments or even monthly payments of zero are burdened by student-loan debt that grows with each passing month due to accruing interest and which will never be repaid.

They are also burdened by the specter of a huge tax bill when DOE eventually writes off their loans two decades or more into the future. Like Ms. Hopson, many people will be long past retirement age when their IBRP payment obligations come to an end. And like Ms. Hopson most people in IBRPs won't have sufficient retirement savings to live their last years in comfort and dignity.

*****

A few notes in closing. First, Judge Cox ruled that Ms. Hopson could maintain a "substantial standard of living" while making student-loan payments of zero dollars a month. Apparently, the judge concluded Hopson was living above a minimal lifestyle because she rented a two-bedroom apartment. Judge Cox pointed out Hopson could save $225 a month if she moved into a one-bedroom apartment.

Second, Adam Merrill, a Chicago lawyer, represented Ms. Hopson pro bono. I want to especially commend him for taking on Ms. Hopson's case without a fee.

Finally, Judge Cox did not state in her opinion when Ms. Hopson's 25-year repayment plan will end. Perhaps the date was not important to the judge.  In this essay I presumed that Hopson signed up for a 25-year repayment plan fairly recently and that it won't conclude until she is in her 80s.

Judge Jacqueline Cox: No mercy for a 63-year-old student-loan debtor

References

Hopson v. Illinois Student Assistance Commission, 588 B.R. 509 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018).

Kinney v. National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust: Iowa bankruptcy judge discharges student loans that a man cosigned for his niece (originally posted 2.08.2019)

 Anthony Kinney, a 52-year-old working guy with a modest job in the plastic industry, co-signed three student loans for his niece. His niece defaulted, and National Collegiate Master Student Trust I (probably an investment fund) began efforts to collect on two of the loans from Kinney.

Kinney filed for bankruptcy to discharge the loans, and he made two arguments. First, he argued that the Bankruptcy Code's "undue hardship" rule didn't apply to him because he only cosigned the loans and received no benefit from them. Second, Kinney maintained that paying back his niece's loans would be an undue hardship.

Bankruptcy Judge Thad Collins declined to rule on Kinney's first argument, but he agreed with Kinney that repaying the loans would be an undue hardship. In ruling for Kinney, Judge Collins interpreted "undue hardship" under the "totality of circumstances" standard, which is the standard used in the Eighth Circuit.

Judge Collins noted that Kinney made about $37,000 a year and was never likely to make more than $40,000. Moreover, Kinney had no financial resources other than his job, and his 401K retirement account only contained about $3,000.

Judge Collins also examined Kinney's living expenses, which he found to be reasonable and necessary. Kinney's resources were adequate to maintain a modest living standard, the Judge determined, but not enough to maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to pay his niece's student loans, which were accruing interest at  more than 12 percent. In addition, Kinney was living with an aunt and uncle while he went through bankruptcy, but this was a short-term solution to his housing needs. Kinney's future housing costs were definitely headed upward.

Judge Collins concluded his brief opinion by observing that Kinney was "in a very precarious financial situation," with no savings and minimal retirement funds. Having found that Kinney had no capacity to make loan payments, the Judge ruled that "requiring [Kinney] to repay either of the two loans . . . would result in undue hardship."

Judge Collins ended his opinion with a brief comment about the fact that Kinney was a cosigner of his niece's student loans. Although Kinney's cosigner status was legally insignificant to the Judge's undue hardship determination, Judge Collins found it relevant that Kinney received no educational benefit from his niece's student loans. In the Judge Collins' opinion, the lack of educational benefit weighed against Kinney's creditor.

Why is the Kinney case important? Two reasons:

First, the case illustrates the terrible consequences that people can face when they cosign a relative's student loans. The original lender probably didn't care whether Kinney's niece could pay back her loans because it knew that Kinney was also on the hook.

Second, Judge Collin's succinct decision went to the heart of the matter concerning student-loan debt. It was quite clear that Kinney would never be able to pay back his niece's student loans, which were accruing interest at 12 percent and which had nearly doubled in size since she originally borrowed the money.

Isn't ability to repay a student loan the only reasonable consideration when an overwhelmed student-loan debtor files for bankruptcy? And when it is clear that a college-loan borrower cannot repay his or her student loans, why not give that borrower the fresh start the bankruptcy courts were established to provide?

Thank God for bankruptcy judges like Judge Thad Collins. We need more judges like him.

Don't cosign a student loan!

References

Kinney v. National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust I, 593 B.R. 618 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 20180.

Dicent v. Kaplan University: An unhappy student sues a for-profit university, but the Third Circuit forces her to arbitrate her claims (first posted on 4.20.2019)

 Maria Dicent enrolled in an online legal studies program at Kaplan University in 2014. She did not have a good experience. In 2017, she sued Kaplan in a federal court, accusing the for-profit university of making false claims and disseminating false advertisements.

According to Ms. Dicent, Kaplan lured her into enrolling in Kaplan's online program by using deceptive tactics. She said she had not been informed that she would need 180 hours to graduate, far more hours than a typical four-year degree program requires and that she had not been able to keep her eBooks, which she apparently paid to use. She also said Kaplan's financial aid office retaliated against her because she refused to allow her photo to be used to promote Kaplan.

Unfortunately for Ms. Dicent. she signed an arbitration agreement when she enrolled at Kaplan back in 2014. In that agreement, Dicent promised not to sue Kaplan and to arbitrate any claims she might have against the for-profit. She also agreed to waive her right to a jury trial.

Based on the arbitration agreement, a federal trial court threw out Dicent's suit and ordered her to arbitrate her clam. Dicent, who pursued her case without a lawyer, then appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which sided with the trial court.

Dicent argued on appeal that she was not aware of the arbitration agreement, but the Third Circuit did not buy her argument. A clearly labeled Arbitration Agreement was included in Dicent's enrollment packet, the court noted; and Dicent admitted having signed the packet with an e-signature.

Dicent v. Kaplan University is an unfortunate decision. The Obama administration recognized that for-profit colleges were using arbitration agreements to prevent students from suing them for fraud or other misconduct. Obama's Department of Education adopted a regulation forbidding the for-profits from forcing their students to sign arbitration agreements.

 Betsy DeVos, President Trump's Secretary of Education, scuttled the Obama ruled shortly after taking office, but a federal court ordered her to implement it. In light of that ruling, Secretary DeVos released new guidance to the for-profit colleges, instructing them to drop enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements.

In recent years, a few courts have invalidated arbitration agreements on various grounds. Some courts have labeled them adhesion contracts--agreements which a stronger party forces a weaker party to sign on unfavorable terms. Other courts have looked at the inherent unfairness in some of these agreements. For example, a California court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement that required California students to arbitrate their disputes against a medical-training school in Indiana.

Poor Ms. Dicent. Acting without an attorney, she was probably unaware of the legal arguments that can be made against arbitration agreements that for-profit colleges require students to sign as a condition of enrollment. She may not have known that the Obama administration recognized these agreements for what they are--a shyster tactic to protect for-profit colleges from being sued for fraud.

I feel quite certain that Ms. Dicent was telling the truth when she said she did not know about the mandatory arbitration agreement until Kaplan submitted it in district court. Almost all students sign long, turgid documents as a condition of enrollment, and most of them sign without reading. What would be the point? When students enroll at a for-profit college, they are enrolling on the college's terms, and they realize they have no power to negotiate.

What is so bad about arbitration agreements? First of all, the complaining party is usually required to pay half the arbitrator's fees, so arbitration may be more expensive for the student than a lawsuit. Second, arbitration agreements often bar students from banding together to file class actions suits, which is virtually the only way students can obtain justice against the well-funded for-profits with their battalions of lawyers.

Finally, it is well known that arbitration generally favors the corporate party. That is why banks, financial-services institutions, and for-profit colleges force their customers to sign them. The arbitrators know they will see a defrauded student only once, but they will see the corporate party again and again. If they get a reputation for siding with the underdog, the corporations won't choose them to arbitrate their disputes.

The for-profits know they will repeatedly be accused of defrauding their students. The best way to deal with this constant threat is to get the students to promise not to sue before allowing them to enroll. Then when students get defrauded--as many of them will--there will be damn little they can do about it.

References

Dicent v. Kaplan University, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-01488 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2018), aff,d No-18-2982 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2019).

Dicent v. Kaplan University, WL 158083, No-18-2982 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2019) (unpublished opinion).

Kreighbaum, Andrew (2019, March 18).  DeVos Tells Colleges to Drop Arbitration Agreements, Inside Higher Ed.